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Abstract
We use nationally representative household data from India to establish the intergenera-
tional effect of early marriage on a broad set of health and educational investments and out-
comes, and to explicate the underlying mechanisms. The empirical strategy utilizes variation
in age at menarche to obtain exogenous variation in the age at marriage. We find that delayed
marriage results in significantly better child health and educational outcomes. We further ana-
lyze a subsample of uneducated child brides to show that the age at marriage matters by itself,
independently of its effects via the woman’s educational attainment and her marriage market
outcome. From a household-decision-making perspective, the effects appear to be due (at least
in part) to a reduction in desired and actual fertility as a result of later marriage, which may be
associated with a quantity/quality tradeoff.
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1 Introduction
Early marriage of women is a common practice in many parts of the developing world, with
significant numbers of women being married before the age of 18.1 A number of studies have
confirmed a negative correlation between earlymarriage and the health and educational outcomes
of women and their children (Bruce 2003, Clark 2004, Nour 2006, Raj et al. 2009, Santhya et al.
2010). Some recent studies confirm that this observed relation has a causal component: Field
and Ambrus (2008) show that delaying marriage has a causal effect on the woman’s educational
attainment and her prenatal investments in rural Bangladesh. Sekhri and Debnath (2014) find that,
in India, children of women who get married later perform significantly better on arithmetic and
reading tasks.
We make two contributions to this literature. We utilize nationally representative data from
India to establish, for the first time, the intergenerational effects of early marriage on a broad
set of indicators of child well-being, including health and educational attainment. To isolate the
causal influence of marriage age, we employ the empirical strategy proposed by Field and Am-
brus (2008), who instrument the woman’s age at marriage by her age at menarche. This instru-
ment is motivated by the observation that has been made by sociologists and anthropologists that
parents become extremely anxious to marry off their daughter once she has reached menarche,
partly to avert any unwanted pregnancies (Caldwell et al. 1983; Srinivas 1984).2 Using this in-
strumental variable strategy, we find that early marriage results in lower health and educational
investments and worsens the health and educational outcomes of the woman’s children. We find,
for instance, that a one-year delay in marriage would increase the probability of the child com-
pleting its required vaccinations by 4.6 percent, and increases its probability of school enrolment
by 3.1 percent, while increasing the child’s weight-for-height z-score by 0.08 and his/her reading
and math test scores by 2.3 and 3 percent respectively.3
1For instance, in India 27.1% of women between the ages of 15 and 19 are married (the legal minimum age is 18
years). Corresponding figures for other selected countries are: 46.1% in Bangladesh, 42% in Chad, 32.9% in Malawi,
50.4% in Mali, 38.2% in Mozambique and 31.7% in Nigeria (data from Demographic and Health surveys between 2003
and 2005). For an overview on the practice of early marriage, see among others, Bloom and Reddy (1986), Althaus
(1991), Singh & Samara (1996), and Jensen and Thornton (2003).
2According to Caldwell et al. (1983), “. . . a major control over the age at marriage of women is provided by the
fact that many families feel deep disquiet and guilt over the presence of an unmarried menstruating daughter in the
household. . . ”
3These effects are all statistically significant when we apply a multiple testing correction to the p-values (Benjamini
et al 2006).
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Our second contribution is to unpack the channels which mediate the effect of early marriage
on child outcomes. The age at which a woman gets married may matter for a number of reasons:
First, early marriage curtails a woman’s education, with many women dropping out of school
around the time of marriage. Field and Ambrus (2008) find that each additional year that mar-
riage is delayed results in 0.22 additional years of schooling (see also Maertens 2013). This can
then affect household outcomes by affecting the woman’s knowledge, preferences, and bargain-
ing power (see, among others, Glewwe 1999; Christiaensen and Alderman 2004; Gakidou et al.
2010; Banerji et al 2013). Second, women who marry early might marry into households that are
systematically different (perhapsworse) than the average household (see Sivasankaran 2014), with
attendant implications for post-marital outcomes. Finally, the age at which the woman enters the
spousal household may matter directly e.g. younger women may be less able to advocate for their
preferences in the spousal household4, which matters to the extent that women and men have
different preferences for investment in children’s health and education (Beegle et al 2001, Maitra
2004, Allendorf 2007, Atkin 2009, Majlesi 2014). Field and Ambrus (2008) refer to this channel as
representing an "age effect".
We attempt to empirically isolate the mediating channels by means of two successive sample
restrictions. First, following Field and Ambrus (2008), we restrict the sample to women who have
never attended school (the uneducated sample). In this sample, variations in the age at marriage
are not associated with variation in educational attainment, thereby allowing us to exclude the
education channel. Next, we further restrict the sample to a set of "child brides" - women who
were engaged to be married before they attained menarche.5 This sample restriction is based on
the observation that for many child brides, marriage is entered into at a very early age, but co-
habitation tends to be postponed until after the girl has reached puberty. In this final subsample,
therefore, the timing of menarche plays a role in determining the age at cohabitation, but does
not correlate with spousal characteristics, which are predetermined (this is a testable assumption
that we are able to verify in the data), or with educational attainment (because the girl was not
attending school to begin with). Thus, by restricting the sample to non-educated child brides, we
4Indeed, some have argued that this may help explain why certain men might demand young brides (Caldwell et
al. 1983).
5We recognise that there might be women in the general sample who might have informally arranged a match
during childhood, but due to lack of information on this informal process, cannot include these women in our analysis.
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are able to exclude the channels of education and spousal choice, and to examine whether the age
at cohabitation matters directly for intergenerational outcomes.6
We find first that the effects of early marriage on child educational and health outcomes persist
even after excluding education and spousal selection effects, i.e. there appear to be beneficial "age
effects" in the child bride sample. In general, the beneficial effects of delaying marriage are largest
in the child bride sample and smallest in the uneducated sample, indicating that the education
channel reinforces the age channel, but that these effects are partially counteracted by sorting in
the marriage market.
We further unpack the effect of early marriage by examining its impacts on the household
decision-making process. To do so, we investigate the effect of early marriage on the woman’s
fertility, and her status in the household as evidenced by her participation in household decisions
and freedom of mobility. We find that delayed marriage is associated with delayed childbearing
(as measured by the age at first birth) as well as lower completed fertility. At the same time, we
find a reduction in contraceptive usage, suggestive of an attempt to "catch up" to the household’s
desired fertility. Consistent with this interpretation, the reduction in completed fertility appears
to be greater than the reduction in (stated) desired fertility. However the fact that desired fertility
also declines indicates that the effect of delaying marriage is not entirely due to a "mechanical
effect" of delaying fertility.
Our results on the household status outcomes are mixed: While there is some evidence that
later marriage increases a woman’s ability to go places without permission, it also seems to de-
crease her ability to go to these same places alone and her say in household decisions. Field and
Ambrus (2008) examine a more limited set of women’s empowerment outcomes and find some
evidence of increased decision-making and mobility as a result of delaying marriage. Inasmuch
as the fundamental relationship between age at marriage and women’s latent bargaining power
is similar, these varying results suggest challenges in measuring bargaining power.
Overall our results confirm that the age of marriage has important implications for the well-
being of the next generation. Our finding that these implications are not solely mediated by edu-
cation or by spousal choice implies that the age of marriage matters by itself. In conjunction with
6The distinction between marriage and cohabitation is only relevant for the sample of child brides. We refer to
marriage throughout the paper, except where the distinction is important.
4
our finding that the beneficial effects of later marriage are not entirely undone by marriage market
sorting (as evidenced by the fact that the effects of child outcomes persist even in the full sample),
this provides a rationale for direct policy interventions to increase the age of marriage, over and
above policies that target educational attainment. 7 In India the legal minimum age of marriage
is 18 years for women, despite which more than 50% of women in our data report being married
before the age of 18, indicating the weakness of enforcement. In recent years, economic incentives
have also been attempted, most notably in the state of Haryana, which provided cash incentives
for delaying marriage.8 Such programs may provide a promising alternative to legal enforcement
of age minimums in an environment in which social norms play a large constraining role on the
choices of women.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the dataset used and pro-
vides some summary statistics. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy and Section 4 reports the
results. Section 5 concludes with a discussion.
2 Data
The analysis uses data from the India Human Development Survey 2005 (IHDS). The IHDS is
a nationally representative survey of 41,554 rural and urban Indian households in all twenty-
eight states and five union territories.9 The IHDS sampled ever-married women between the
ages of 15 and 49 (one was randomly chosen from each surveyed household), who were then
administered a separate health and education questionnaire that included questions on marriage
and reproductive history, as well as questions on health investments. For the analysis, we restrict
ourself to women who are married only once, and exclude the women who marry above the age
of 40 years, leaving us with 32,741 women. We will refer to this sample as the "full sample".
We will also analyze two subsamples: A subsample of women who never attended school (i.e.
have zero years of education), and a subsample of women who were married before they attained
7Economic opportunities for women are another policy that can lead to delayedmarriage. Jensen (2012), for instance,
using a Randomized Controlled Trial design, shows that young unmarried women exposed to recruiting services of
local business process outsourcing firms were significantly less likely to get married or have children. See also Maitra
and Gangadharan (2003), Kirdar et al. (2009) and Heath and Mobarak (2015).
8While to our knowledge there is no evidence yet on the effects of this program on girls’ age at marriage – likely
due to the fact that recent data are not yet available – there is evidence that this program increased the human capital
investments in girls (Sinha and Yoong 2009).
9Lakshwadeep and the Andaman and Nicobar islands were excluded.
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menarche ("child brides") and who never went to school. These subsamples consist of 18,795 and
2,487 women, respectively.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on the three analysis samples. The uneducated sample
and the sample of uneducated child brides are clearly quite different from the full sample on
a number of dimensions, including household size, wealth and consumption, and fertility. As
expected, the age at marriage declines as we go from the full sample to the child bride sample.
Figure 1 graphs the distribution of the age at marriage for each of the three samples. It can also
be seen from Table 1 that on average there is a difference of 2.44 years between marriage and
cohabitation for the child bride sample, whereas cohabitation closely followsmarriage in the other
two samples.
The analysis focuses on a number of groups of outcomes. We describe these below:
1. Health investments: These include pre- and post-natal health investments for the woman’s
last two births since 2000, specifically, (a) A binary indicator for any antenatal care (b) A binary
indicator for home birth, (c) Duration of breastfeeding (inweeks), and (d) An indicator for whether
the child completed the full WHO-recommended set of vaccinations.
2. Child health outcomes: These include (a) Size at birth (as reported by the mother for each
of her last two births since 2000) - this is a categorical variable that takes values 1 through 4, with
4 indicating the largest size, (b) Weight-for-height of the women’s children under the age of 5
(converted to z-scores), (c) An indicator for incidents of major morbidity of children under the age
of 18, and (d) An indicator for mortality in the first year of life for all the children the woman gave
birth to.
3. Educational investments: These include current school enrolment and number of completed
years of schooling for all children.
4. Educational outcomes: These include scores on reading, writing and math tests that the
survey administered to all children between the ages of 8 and 11. The reading score is a number
between 0 and 4: A reading score of 1 corresponds to ability to read letters, 2 corresponds to
ability to read words, 3 corresponds to ability to read paragraphs and 4 corresponds to ability
to read stories. The mathematics score is a number between 0 and 3: A mathematics score of 1
corresponds to ability to do recognize numbers, 2 to ability to do subtraction and 3 to ability to
do division. The writing score is a binary indicator for whether the child is able to write a simple
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sentence with 2 or fewer mistakes.
5. Women’s status in the household: This set includes subjective assessments of the woman’s
decision-making power in the household. We create indices that summarize the following groups
of outcomes: (a) Self-reported say in household decision-making: Whether the respondent reports
participating in decisions about expensive household purchases, what to cook, howmany children
to have, what to do when children are ill and whom the children should marry, (b) Ability to go
alone to the local health center, the local store or visit relatives and friends, (c) Ability to go to
these same places without asking permission from her husband or a senior family member10, and
(d) Discussion: Whether the respondent and her husband talk about business matters, household
expenditure and local politics never, sometimes, or often11. In addition, we look at: (e) Whether
men usually eat first when the household takes its main meal, (f) Whether she goes out with
her husband (either by themselves or with the children), and (g) Employment outside the home:
Whether the woman reports having worked for cash in the previous year12, and how many hours
she worked for cash last year.
6. Health knowledge: The woman was asked questions to test her knowledge of nutrition,
fertility, hygiene and HIV/AIDS (these questions range from breast-feeding practices, diarrhea
treatment to HIV transmission). We create two indices by summing the number of correct answers
to questions about (a) general health practices, and (b) AIDS.
7. Fertility: We examine the onset of fertility, in terms of the mother’s age at first birth, as
well as her desired number of children, and her completed fertility (for women who state that
they do no desire any more children). We also examine whether women are currently using any
contraceptive methods.
10While these variables may seem to overlap considerably with her reports of whether she can go alone, this is far
from complete. For instance, of the 74 percent of respondents needing to ask permission to go to the health clinic, 65
percent can go alone.
11Each response is converted into two binary variables: at least sometimes, or often, and then normalized to have
standard deviation one and summed.
12That is, this variable does not reflect all the work the respondent may do, such as self employment or employment
on another member’s farm. However, there is evidence that working outside of the home for cash is more likely to
empower a woman within the home (Anderson and Eswaran 2009) and also is more likely to respond to exogenous
empowerment within the home (Heath and Tan 2015b).
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3 Analytical strategy
3.1 Conceptual framework
We conceptualize the link between age at marriage and intergenerational outcomes as arising in
two stages. In the first stage, the age at marriage implies a set of decisions: (i) The age at co-
habitation, (ii) Educational attainment, and (iii) Spousal choice.13 In the next stage, each of these
decisions has implications for the primitives in a model of household decision-making, namely
the preferences and bargaining power of the woman and her spouse, as well as the choice set that
they face. For instance, if marriage curtails the woman’s education, this may affect her earning
ability and thereby affect the choice set of the household, in addition to affecting her bargaining
power in the spousal household. Similarly, the age at which the woman enters the spousal house-
hold may have a bearing on the relations she develops with her spouse and his parents, and hence
her status and bargaining power in the household. Her age at cohabitation may also impose a
constraint on the choice set of the household, in terms of fertility choices. In particular, it may me-
chanically affect the age at which the woman begins to bear children, which is important because
early childbearing is known to have significant health risks for both mother as well as child.
Broadly speaking, our objective is first to establish the overall causal effect of the age at mar-
riage, and then to disentangle the causal effects of the various decisions embodied in the marriage
decision. A related objective is to understand how the marriage decision affects the fundamentals
of the decision-making process in the spousal household, i.e., its effects on the choice set, prefer-
ences and bargaining power.
3.2 Empirical strategy
3.2.1 Identifying the effect of age at marriage
We consider the following regression model where yij denotes an outcome for child i of woman j :
yij = α+ βAgeMarriagej + γXj + θYij + eij (1)
13One can think of other decisions that are embodied in the marriage decision, but the ones identified here are those
that we think plausibly matter for the outcomes we are interested in.
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where AgeMarriagej denotes the woman’s age at marriage, Xj denotes a vector of individual
and household-level controls, including the woman’s age and district and caste fixed effects, Yij is
a vector of child-level controls, including gender and age (and the interaction between child age
and child gender, to capture the fact that gender differences cumulate over time) and εij is an error
term.14
Amajor concern is that age at marriage is plausibly correlated with the error terms in equation
(1) (children of women who choose to marry early might, for instance, be predisposed to worse
later-life outcomes). To address this concern, we follow Field and Ambrus (2008) and Sekhri and
Debnath (2014) by instrumenting age at marriage by the age at menarche of the woman. This
strategy is motivated by the observation that has been made by sociologists and anthropologists
that parents in India become anxious to marry off their daughter once she has reached menarche.
We discuss the underlying assumptions of this strategy in detail in Section 3.2.3.
The child-level dependent variables of interest are health and educational investments and
outcomes (the full set of variables is described in Section 2). We apply the False Discovery Rate
(FDR) correction procedure of Benjamini et al. (2006) within each group of variables in order to
account for multiple testing in a group of potentially correlated outcomes.
3.2.2 Identifying mechanisms
We start by attempting to examine the channels that mediate the effect of the age at marriage.
First, we follow Field and Ambrus (2008) to abstract away from education effects by restricting
the sample to women who were no longer in school by the time they reached marriageable age.
To do so, we focus on women who never attended school (i.e. they have zero years of education),
and repeat the previous set of estimations for this sample.15 In this subsample, the age at marriage
affects outcomes via its effect on spousal characteristics and/or directly, via "age effects".
Next, we attempt to test for "age effects", i.e. whether age at cohabitation matters for child
outcomes. To do so, we further restrict the sample to include only child brides, i.e. women who
married before they reached puberty - in such marriages, cohabitation is often postponed until
14Note that we cannot include mother fixed-effects as this would sweep out the effect of AgeMarriage.
15Differently from Field and Ambrus(2008) who restrict the sample to women who dropped out of school prior to
menarche, we restrict the sample to women who have zero education. This is because although the IHDS data indicate
the number of educational grades the woman has completed, it is not possible to infer exactly when (i.e. at what age) a
woman dropped out of school, as the starting age and whether or not grades were repeated are not known.
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the woman reaches menarche. Within this sample, therefore, the timing of menarche affects the
age at cohabitation, but cannot affect spousal choice since the latter is pre-determined. This as-
sumption is testable, by regressing observed characteristics of the spousal household on the age at
menarche. We carry out this exercise for four spousal household characteristics that we can iden-
tify in the data: (i) The education of the mother-in-law, (ii) The education of the father-in-law, (iii)
Whether or not the spousal household is in the same village as the woman’s natal household, and
(iv) The distance of the spousal household from the natal household.16 Appendix Table 1 presents
the results of this exercise separately for all three samples. In line with our intuition, these char-
acteristics of the spousal household are indeed affected by the age at menarche in the full sample
and the uneducated sample, but not in the child bride sample. This provides reassurance that age
at menarche is indeed a credible instrument for age at cohabitation in the (non-educated) child
bride sample.
Thus, we are now estimating:
yij = α+ βAgeCohabitationj + γXj + θYij + uj (2)
where the error uj absorbs maternal education as well as spousal characteristics, and where
age at cohabitation is instrumented for by the age at menarche.
Comparing effect sizes across the three samples will help shed light on the size and direction of
age effects, education effects and marriage market sorting effects. One caveat that we should note
at the outset is that there is a clear gradient in socio-economic status across the three subsamples
(see Table 1) that may result in heterogeneous effects. For example, if the effects of early cohabi-
tation mainly work through a bargaining channel and if this is especially significant for younger
women, then we would expect age effects to be larger in the child bride sample. Or alternatively,
one may speculate that by having entered into marriage well before cohabitation, the child brides
may have already developed a particular relationship with their future in-laws prior to cohabita-
tion, so that the actual age at which they enter the spousal household does not have a strong effect
on their status in the new household. The potential heterogeneity of effect sizes across samples
16Other observable household characteristics such as husband’s education, household size, income, consumption
and wealth are however outcomes of the marriage and cohabitation decisions, and therefore cannot be used to test the
exclusion restriction.
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should therefore be borne in mind when interpreting the results.
Lastly, we attempt to shed light on which elements of the household decision making process
are affected by the age at marriage/cohabitation. We utilize the same regression specifications
as before, but this time the outcome variables are (i) Female employment, income and survey
measures of bargaining power, and (ii) Fertility preferences and knowledge of health practices.
The specific outcome variables are described in Section 2.
In addition to examining the effects on these measures, we also consider the hypothesis that
the woman’s bargaining powermay be reflected in gender differential investments in her children,
e.g., women who have greater say in household decisions may tend to equalize investments in
sons and daughters.17 We test this hypothesis by estimating the separate effects of the age at
marriage on boys and girls.
3.2.3 Validity of the instrumental variable strategy
Field and Ambrus (2008) argue that a significant portion of the variation in timing of menarche
is random, rendering it a good instrument for the age at marriage. While studies of twins have
found that random genetic variation is the single largest source of variations in menarche (Kaprio
et al. 1995),18 some studies have reported an association between environmental factors and the
age at menarche. Specifically, poor childhood nutrition (Karlberg 2002) and hard physical labor
(Pellerin-Massicotte et al 1987) have been shown to delaymenarche. At the same time, exposure to
environmental toxins has also been shown to increase hormonal levels, leading to earliermenarche
(Blanck et al. 2000; Windham et al. 2004). Thus, women who end up delaying marriage may also
be undernourished and/or been less exposed to environmental toxins, and this could have a direct
effect on some of the outcomes we are considering.
We undertake two strategies tominimize the potential endogeneity of menarche. First, we con-
trol for district fixed effects to account for spatial variation in exposure to environmental factors
that affect menarche.19 Second, to account for any remaining within-district variation in environ-
mental conditions and health investments, we follow the approach of Field and Ambrus (2008)
17On average, daughters have significantly less years of schooling, are less likely to be enrolled, and have worse test
scores than sons - this is true for children in all three samples.
18See also Treloar and Martin (1990) on the importance of genetic variation.
19Most marriages occur within the same district (see Fulford 2015), so that the district of residence of the married
woman is most likely also her natal district.
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and Debnath and Sekhri (2014) in including mother’s height in the vector of controls, X. If height
is a sufficient statistic for health investments and under-nutrition that is severe enough to affect
menarche also results in stunting, then conditioning on height will eliminate any confounding
from health investments that affect both menarche andmarriage conditions. Since height is clearly
closely related to health even if it is not a sufficient statistic for health (Strauss and Thomas 1998),
the fact that controlling for health has very small effects on our results suggests that they are not
driven by unobserved health inputs that also affect age at menarche.
In Figure 2, we graphically examine the relationship between height and the age at menarche
in the data: Although the relationship is flat over the range 10-15 years (which accounts for 90% of
the sample), there is a small but significant positive relation between the two variables at higher
ages. This positive relation is inconsistent with the nutritional channel above, but is in line with
the hypothesis that menarche ends the growth spurt which takes place during puberty, resulting
in a positive correlation between adult height and menarche (see Onland-Moret et al. 2005). In
this case, maternal height is an important control because it rules out a direct channel by which
the age at menarche may affect children’s health outcomes, e.g. maternal height has been linked
to pre-term birth and low birth-weight (see Han et al 2012 for a review of the literature).
In Table 2 we test the strength of the instrument by regressing the age at marriage/cohabitation
on the age at menarche separately for each of the three samples; these are our first-stage regres-
sions. Menarche is a strong predictor of the age at marriage/cohabitation: A one-year delay in
menarche delays marriage by 0.45 and 0.50 years, respectively in the full sample and the unedu-
cated sample, and delays cohabitation by 0.59 years in the child bride sample.
A remaining consideration is measurement error in the age at menarche. While this is possi-
ble given that it was self-reported by respondents at the time of the survey, menarche is a major
event for girls in India, and girls of both low and high caste report knowing little or nothing about
menstruation before it began, but afterwards learning of taboos about eating and mobility dur-
ing menstrual periods (Garg et al. 2001, Sharma et al 2006).20 These lifestyle changes imply that
respondents are likely to recall its timing fairly accurately. Furthermore, the distribution of re-
ported age at menarche (Figure 3) does not show any heaping at key ages (such as round numbers
20Field and Ambrus (2008) make a similar argument that life events accompanying menarche increase the likelihood
that respondents remember it accurately.
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or school leaving ages) that would suggest significant recall error. Of course, this evidence does
not definitively prove that there is no recall error in menarche. Inasmuch as any recall error is
imperfectly correlated with recall error in the age of cohabitation, however, our instrumental vari-
ables estimates reduce the downward bias due to measurement error in OLS estimates. Indeed, in
section 4.2 we propose that this might help explain why the OLS estimates of the effect of age at co-
habitation on child health and education are smaller than the IV estimates. To the extent that there
may still be correlation in the measurement errors in age at menarche and age at cohabitation, the
IV estimates still represent a lower bound on the true causal effect of age at cohabitation.
4 Results
We start by examining the effect of age at marriage on child investments and outcomes in the full
sample. The top panel in Tables 3-6 present the results using the regression specification in (1). For
comparison, we present the OLS estimates alongside the IV estimates, but focus our discussion on
the IV estimates. The tables also report the baseline mean of each of the dependent variables, as
well as the Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic that tests the strength of the instrumental variable without
assuming iid standard errors.
Table 3 shows that a one-year delay in marriage reduces the probability of home birth by 1.2
percentage points (2.2 percent), increases the duration of breastfeeding by 0.85 weeks (5.1 percent)
and the probability that the child completes his/her full set of WHO-recommended vaccinations
by 1.9 percentage points (4.6 percent). These are economically and statistically significant effects.
Next, we examine whether these effects on health investments are manifested in child health out-
comes. Table 4 shows that a one-year delay in marriage increases size at birth by 0.025 units (recall
that this is a categorical variable that takes values from 1 through 4), and the weight-for-height
z-score by 0.084. We do not however find any significant effects on mortality, although statistical
power is an issue given that mortality is a relatively rare outcome. Overall, Tables 3 and 4 establish
that the age at marriage has a strong causal effect on health investments and outcomes.
We now look at educational investments (Table 5) and outcomes (Table 6). Increasing the age
at marriage by one year increases the number of years of education of the woman’s children by,
on average, 0.11 years (1.9 percent) and the probability that her children are currently enrolled in
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school by 2.5 percentage points (3.1 percent). These estimates are highly statistically significant.
Table 6 shows that a one-year delay in marriage improves the children’s scores in reading and
math by 0.061 (2.3 percent) and 0.048 (3 percent) respectively.
Next, we attempt to understand the mediating channels by repeating the estimations for the
two subsamples. The results are reported in the middle and lower panels of Tables 3-6.
In terms of pre- and post-natal health investments, we do not find statistically significant ef-
fects of age at marriage in the uneducated sample (Panel B), although the coefficients are in the
right direction and of comparable magnitude to those in the full sample. In the child bride sample
(Panel C), we find a significant effect of age at cohabitation on the probability of obtaining antena-
tal care in the child bride sample. In this sample, we also estimate a large effect (1.45 months) on
the duration of breastfeeding, although this is not statistically significant. The effects on measured
health outcomes (Table 4) are more striking: In the child bride sample, there is clear evidence that
delaying cohabitation improves birth size and weight-for-height and reduces the incidence of ma-
jor morbidity.21 The estimated effects are large compared to those in the full sample, probably due
to the fact that the child bride sample is starting from an unusually disadvantaged position. In the
uneducated sample (Panel B), the estimates are similar to those for the full sample (although only
the coefficient on size at birth is statistically significant), indicating that the effect of early marriage
is not entirely mediated by its effect on educational attainment.
Our conclusions are reinforced by the results in Tables 5 and 6 on educational investments and
outcomes. Age at marriage has a strong causal effect on school enrolment and attendance (Table
5) even after we restrict the sample to uneducated women (Panel B), and subsequently, the child
brides (Panel C). These effects on investments are manifested in learning outcomes, as measured
by test scores (Table 6). In particular, we find that delayed cohabitation significantly improves
reading and math scores in the child bride sample (Panel C). As before, the estimated effects are
much larger for the child bride sample than in the full sample. In the uneducated sample, the
coefficients are again comparable to those in the full sample, but lack precision.
21Child age is controlled for in all regressions that examine outcomes of surviving children. Implicitly, this also
controls for the mother’s age at birth. Mother’s age at birth can be included in the regressions for birth size and infant
mortality, but this results in a reduction in sample size because of missing data on birth dates for some non-surviving
births. However, the results in Table 4 are robust to this inclusion, suggesting that the positive relationship between
marriage age and birth size is not entirely due to the biological effect of maternal age on pregnancy outcomes. These
results are available on request.
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One common thread across Tables 3 through 6 is that the instrumental variable coefficients are
in general larger in magnitude than the OLS coefficients, i.e. the OLS estimates of age at mar-
riage and cohabitation are biased in a direction that suggests that later marriage and cohabitation
are associated with characteristics that predict adverse outcomes. This may appear somewhat
surprising, but we think three factors should be borne in mind. First, social norms dictate early
marriage, and the women who actually get married later may be ones who are forced to do so for
reasons that also have a negative impact on their outcomes. Second, it is important to note that the
local average treatment effect interpretation of an instrumental variable estimate implies that we
are estimating the causal effect of marriage and cohabitation for the subpopulation whose mar-
riage/cohabitation timing is affected by the instrument, i.e. menarche. It is possible that causal
effects for this subpopulation are larger than those for the population as a whole. Third, measure-
ment error bias differentially affects OLS and IV estimates. If any measurement error in age at
cohabitation is uncorrelated with age at menarche, this would tend to attenuate the estimates in
the OLS regression but not in the IV regression. Even under the more realistic scenario in which
there is also measurement error in the age at menarche which is correlated with the measurement
error in age at marriage - say, because the respondents link these two events in their memories -
the instrumental variable coefficient will still be less biased towards zero than the OLS estimate as
long as the correlation in errors is less than one (Bound et al. 2001).
We now examine whether the age at marriage affects various elements of the household de-
cision making process, both as important outcomes in their own right and as a potential channel
linking age at marriage and children’s human capital investments. We begin by looking at the
effect of age of marriage on fertility. The results are in Table 7. The age at marriage has a statisti-
cally and economically significant impact on completed fertility in all three samples (Columns 1
and 5): The IV estimates indicate that a one year increase in age at marriage decreases the number
of children the woman has given birth to by 0.08, 0.05 and 0.12 in the full, uneducated and child
bride samples respectively. Part, but not all, of this reduction appears to reflect a reduction in
desired fertility (Columns 2 and 6): A one-year delay in the age at marriage reduces the desired
number of children by approximately 0.5 in the full sample. The point estimate is similar in the
child bride sample (Panel C), and slightly smaller in the uneducated sample (Panel B), although
neither of the latter coefficients is statistically significant. We also find consistently strong effects
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on the age at first birth (Columns 3 and 7): A one year increase in the age at marriage delays child-
bearing by 0.80, 0.75 and 0.37 years in the full, uneducated and child bride samples respectively.
The results on age at first birth suggest the possibility that the reduction in fertility may be partly
due to a mechanical effect of delaying marriage, since most women in India bear children shortly
after marriage. There is some suggestive evidence of such a mechanical effect: As we show in
Columns 4 and 8, a delay in the age of marriage reduces the probability of contraceptive usage
in all samples, which may be interpreted as reflecting an attempt to "catch up" to the household’s
desired fertility.
Next we examine the woman’s self-reported assessments of her role in the household. Tables
8 and 9 present these results. Increasing the age of marriage by a year actually decreases the in-
dex of the woman’s say in household decisions (namely, expensive household purchases, what to
cook, howmany children to have, what to do when children are ill and whom the children should
marry) by a small but statistically significant mean of 0.028 standard deviations and decreases
the index of whether she can go to certain places alone (namely, the local health center, the local
store and relatives/friends) by an average of 0.034 standard deviations. However, later marriage
actually increases the likelihood that a woman can go to these same places without permission.
Note that the coefficients in this tables are more precisely estimated, allowing us to say with some
precision that later marriage has no effect on her discussions with her husband. The results for
bargaining indices are similar in the uneducated subsample and sample of child brides, suggest-
ing that age effects contribute to the bargaining results in the overall sample. Other results (in
Table 9) are similarly mixed: Each year a marriage is delayed increases by 1.8 percentage points
the likelihood that a woman goes out with her husband and decreases by 1.6 percentage points
the likelihood that men eat first in her household. It also decreases by 1.2 percentage points the
probability that she worked for cash last year.
It thus appears that while bargaining power measured by some of the more traditional mea-
sures such as "having a say" and "ability to go to places alone" seems to decrease in response to
later cohabitation, more general measures reflecting the quality of the relationship between the
woman and her husband improve as a result of later cohabitation. Given our finding that later
cohabitation improves child health, consistent with other papers that find effects of women’s bar-
gaining power on child health (Thomas 1994; Duflo 2003; Rangel 2006; Atkin 2009; Majlesi 2016),
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one potential interpretation of the mixed nature of these results is that survey measures of par-
ticipation in household decisions do not always measure how bargaining power is determined,
especially in a vulnerable population like our subsample of child brides with no education.
In Tables 10 and 11, we test whether the age at marriage has differential effects depending on
the gender of the child, as an indirect test of whether the age at marriage affects the woman’s
bargaining power. To test for such differences, we interact the age at marriage with an indicator
for female children, while instrumenting age at marriage and its interaction with gender with the
age at menarche and its interaction with the gender dummy. In the interest of space, we omit the
results from the OLS specifications. Overall, Tables 10 and 11 do not indicate any strong evidence
of differential investments in or outcomes for female children, although there is some suggestive
evidence that male children benefit differentially in terms of nutrition (as measured by weight-
for-height).
In Table 12, we examine whether the observed improvements in child health may be due to
an improvement in health knowledge. We find a marked effect on health knowledge in the full
sample: Increasing the age at marriage by one year increases the woman’s knowledge of general
health and HIV/AIDS. The effects are not entirely mediated by education, however, as indicated
by the fact that delaying marriage also improves health knowledge among uneducated women
(but to a smaller extent than in the full sample).
5 Concluding discussion
Combining a nationally representative household survey from Indiawith an instrumental variable
strategy that relies on the links between age of menarche, age of cohabitation and age of marriage,
we establish the intergenerational health and education effects of early marriage and cohabitation.
We first estimate the overall effects of delayed marriage (the net effect of later cohabitation, more
education, and marital matching channels) and find that early marriage has an adverse effect on
the woman’s children in terms of size at birth and weight-for-height, as well as on learning out-
comes as measured by reading and math tests. We attempt to understand the mediating channels
by restricting the sample first to uneducated women (thereby excluding the education channel)
and next by restricting the sample to uneducated women who were married at an early age but
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did not enter into cohabitation until after menarche - in this sample, we are able to exclude edu-
cational attainment and spousal characteristics as mediating channels, and thereby focus on "age
effects".
To understandmechanisms at the level of the household decision-making process, we examine
the effect of early marriage on fertility and measures of the woman’s status within the household.
Later marriage results in a delay in childbearing (as measured by the age at first birth) and a
decline in completed fertility. The latter partly reflects a change in preferences, as evidenced by a
decline in (stated) desired fertility, but also partly a mechanical effect of delaying childbearing, as
evidenced by a reduction in contraceptive usage, presumably in order to catch up to the house-
hold’s fertility target. The associated delay in childbearing is significant in itself, because early
childbearing is known to carry health risks for both mother and child (Miller 1993, Nour 2006 and
Raj et al. 2009).
Our results on the bargaining/status outcomes are mixed: Later marriage appears to decrease
her say in certain household decisions and her ability to go to places alone, while apparently
improving her status on other dimensions. One interpretation of these results is that standard sur-
vey questions about decision-making may not be accurately capturing a woman’s position in the
household. For instance, if later marriage results in a woman’s preferences being better aligned
with her husband’s, she might not need or want to "exert" her bargaining power.22 Indeed, if
woman’s status does actually improve with later cohabitation – as suggested by the anthropo-
logical evidence and our empirical finding of improved child investment and outcomes – we join
some recent papers in finding that improving a woman’s status (say, by increasing her outside
option) does not always increase standard measures of bargaining power, such as a woman’s par-
ticipation in household decisions (Haushofer and Shapiro 2013; Blattman et al 2014; Roy et al 2015;
Heath and Tan 2015a). These findings suggest that these outcomes instead are results of both a
woman’s ability to make decisions and the outcome that would obtain without her involvement,
so that participation in decisions does not always reflect bargaining power. This ambiguity in
measurement could also help explain why Field and Ambrus (2008) find suggestive evidence of
increased mobility.
22Indeed, women’s empowerment is frequently conceptualized as the ability to make choices (Kabeer 1994) rather
than actuallymaking them. See Doss (2013) for a recent review of the empirical literature on intra-household bargaining
and different ways to measure women’s bargaining power.
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Taken together, our results contribute to existing evidence that delayed marriage leads to ben-
eficial outcomes for the next generation. Our additional finding that some of these results come
from the channel of delayed age at cohabitation confirms the relevance of policies that seek to de-
lay marriage, above and beyond those that seek to increase educational attainment, such as cash
transfers conditional on remaining unmarried. That is, our results provide rationale for a pro-
gram such as the "Our daughters, our wealth" program in Haryana, India that provides payments
to parents of unmarried 18-year-olds, rather than in unmarried and in school, as Bangladesh’s Fe-
male Stipend Program does. Such programswould helpmore families benefit from later marriage,
even if they have chosen to no longer be in school.
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Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Household characteristics
Household size 5.41 2.40 5.69 2.49 5.90 2.56
Monthly per capita consumption (rupees) 1100.66 1026.52 662.46 591.65 637.31 573.90
Household asset index 14.95 5.84 9.23 4.90 8.45 4.54
Woman characteristics
Age 32.19 7.98 33.86 7.94 35.02 7.71
Height (cm) 151.94 6.85 150.70 7.12 150.37 6.83
Education (years) 8.18 3.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age at marriage 18.57 3.48 16.82 2.65 12.77 3.57
Age at cohabitation 18.77 3.30 17.09 2.47 15.21 2.49
Age at menarche 13.78 1.36 13.61 1.22 14.00 1.43
Age at first birth 20.49 3.51 19.54 3.29 18.96 3.41
Number of children 2.37 1.45 3.36 1.90 3.94 2.09
Full sample No education
No education, married 
before menarche
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Notes: The table presents the mean and standard deviation of selected household and woman-specific variables for each 
of the three analysis samples. The household is defined as the persons who live under the same roof and share the same 
kitchen for 6+ months.  The full sample includes all ever-married women who were administered a women's 
questionnaire, who married just once and married under the age of 40 years.  The household assets variable is an index 
that sums 30 dichotomous items measuring household possessions and housing quality.
Full sample No education
No 
education, 
married 
before 
menarche
Age at menarche 0.445*** 0.502*** 0.591***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.039)
Observations 31,537 13,457 2,425
R-squared 0.296 0.252 0.483
Table 2: The effect of age at menarche on age at marriage/cohabitation
Notes: The table shows the results of the first-stage regressions for each of the analysis sample. In Columns 1 and 2, the
dependent variable is the woman's age at marriage. In Column 3, the dependent variable is the woman's age at
cohabitation. All regressions include caste fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and
height. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level. Robust standard
errors reported in parenthesis. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Any 
antenatal 
care Home birth
Breastfeeding 
duration 
(weeks)
Vaccinations 
completed
Any 
antenatal 
care Home birth
Breastfeeding 
duration 
(weeks)
Vaccinations 
completed
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage 0.014*** -0.026*** -0.234*** 0.007*** -0.006 -0.012* 0.852*** 0.019**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.036) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.237) (0.008)
Observations 15,176 15,208 8,408 15,119 15,169 15,201 8,404 15,112
R-squared 0.352 0.382 0.276 0.220 0.337 0.377 0.187 0.215
Mean of dep variable 0.766 0.544 16.81 0.415 0.766 0.544 16.81 0.415
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 422.2 425.2 179.9 411.1
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage 0.013*** -0.010*** -0.116* 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 0.511 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.067) (0.002) (0.010) (0.009) (0.271) (0.009)
Observations 6,571 6,613 3,465 6,612 6,568 6,610 3,463 6,609
R-squared 0.345 0.297 0.323 0.284 0.338 0.297 0.302 0.284
Mean of dep variable 0.616 0.753 17.82 0.300 0.616 0.753 17.82 0.300
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 289.5 288.5 126.7 291.8
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation 0.022** -0.01 -0.059 -0.002 0.082*** -0.008 1.446 -0.020
(0.007) (0.006) (0.203) (0.006) (0.023) (0.020) (0.855) (0.020)
Observations 1,227 1,234 619 1,228 1,227 1,234 619 1,228
R-squared 0.487 0.383 0.563 0.444 0.447 0.382 0.503 0.439
Mean of dep variable 0.521 0.834 18.90 0.233 0.521 0.834 18.90 0.233
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 112.2 110.0 24.10 101.4
Table 3: The effect of age at marriage/cohabitation on child health investments
OLS IV
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables are pre- and post-natal health inputs pertaining to the last two births since 
2000 of each of the three samples of women (excluding also women who married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). In Columns 5-8, the age at 
marriage is instrumented by the age at menarche. All regressions include caste fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and height. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the 
multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Size at birth
Weight for 
height (z-
score)
Major 
sickness
One-year 
mortality Size at birth
Weight for 
height (z-
score)
Major 
sickness
One-year 
mortality
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage 0.001 0.008 -0.000 -0.003*** 0.025** 0.084** -0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.036) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 15,144 12,204 63,830 88,338 15,137 12,200 63,763 88,224
R-squared 0.195 0.129 0.014 0.029 0.185 0.116 0.014 0.028
Mean of dep variable 2.924 -0.410 0.0154 0.0585 2.924 -0.410 0.0154 0.0585
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 423.0 300.1 1769 2915
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage 0.005 0.018 -0.000 -0.003*** 0.057*** 0.050 0 0.001
(0.003) (0.010) (0.000) (0.001) (0.014) (0.041) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 6,595 5,578 31,947 46,287 6,592 5,576 31,908 46,218
R-squared 0.262 0.183 0.019 0.032 0.233 0.181 0.017 0.031
Mean of dep variable 2.903 -0.446 0.0152 0.0749 2.903 -0.446 0.0152 0.0749
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 288.3 248.1 1292 2130
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation 0.017* 0.071** -0.000 -0.002 0.121*** 0.171** -0.005** -0.000
(0.009) (0.025) (0.001) (0.002) (0.032) (0.083) (0.002) (0.004)
Observations 1,229 1,087 6,119 9,507 1,229 1,087 6,112 9,485
R-squared 0.368 0.332 0.084 0.058 0.295 0.321 0.079 0.057
Mean of dep variable 2.890 -0.584 0.0159 0.0961 2.890 -0.584 0.0159 0.0961
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 108.6 99.83 623.0 1140
Table 4: The effect of  age at marriage/cohabitation on child health
OLS IV
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables are health outcomes of children of each of the three samples of women (excluding 
also women who married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). Size at birth is recorded for each of the last two births since 2000. Weight-for-height is 
recorded for children under the age of 5. Major sickness is recorded for all household members: The analysis sample includes children under 18. One-year mortality is recorded for 
all children. In Columns 5-8, the age at marriage is instrumented by the age at menarche. All regressions include caste fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the 
mother's age and height. Controls for child age are included when examining the outcomes of weight-for-height and sickness. Robust standard errorsin parentheses. *** = 
significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False 
Discovery Rate correction procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of 
education
Currently 
enrolled
Years of 
education
Currently 
enrolled
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage 0.049*** 0.008*** 0.113*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.026) (0.004)
Observations 54,341 45,819 54,269 45,764
R-squared 0.592 0.160 0.591 0.149
Mean of dep variable 5.380 0.798 5.380 0.798
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 1450 1244
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage 0.030*** 0.004*** 0.075** 0.018***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.035) (0.006)
Observations 27,964 23,936 27,923 23,903
R-squared 0.471 0.175 0.470 0.171
Mean of dep variable 4.537 0.707 4.537 0.707
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 1029 923.8
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation 0.037* 0.007* 0.149** 0.021**
(0.020) (0.003) (0.060) (0.010)
Observations 5,370 4,620 5,360 4,613
R-squared 0.512 0.248 0.510 0.245
Mean of dep variable 4.235 0.676 4.235 0.676
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 493.6 436.3
Table 5: The effect of age at marriage/cohabitation on child educational investments
OLS IV
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables are educational
investments in children of each of the three samples of women (excluding also women who married twice and women
who had their first marriage over the age of 40). Enrollment only pertains to children between the ages of 6 and 18
years; Number of years of education pertains to all children over the age of 6, whether or not they are enrolled in
school. In Columns 3-4, the age at marriage is instrumented by the age at menarche. All regressions include caste fixed
effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and height, as well as for child age. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level.
Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction
procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reading Writing Math Reading Writing Math
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage 0.045*** 0.013*** 0.041*** 0.061** 0.013 0.048**
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.025) (0.009) (0.019)
Observations 10,423 10,328 10,378 10,411 10,316 10,366
R-squared 0.250 0.191 0.272 0.249 0.191 0.272
Mean of dep variable 2.630 0.700 1.585 2.630 0.700 1.585
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 311.7 310.7 311.7
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage 0.013 0.005 0.007 0.027 -0.002 0.036
(0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.037) (0.013) (0.028)
Observations 5,235 5,194 5,224 5,229 5,188 5,218
R-squared 0.234 0.211 0.264 0.233 0.210 0.260
Mean of dep variable 2.257 0.592 1.292 2.257 0.592 1.292
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 193.5 193.4 194.8
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation 0.015 0.015 0.020 0.139* 0.039 0.117*
(0.021) (0.009) (0.017) (0.069) (0.024) (0.053)
Observations 1,009 995 1,007 1,008 994 1,006
R-squared 0.403 0.350 0.388 0.378 0.343 0.360
Mean of dep variable 2.144 0.541 1.207 2.144 0.541 1.207
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 72.98 71.91 73.46
Table 6: The effect of age at marriage/cohabitation on child educational outcomes
OLS IV
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables are scores on survey-administered
tests of reading, writing and math scores of children of each of the three samples of women (excluding also women who married
twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). The tests were administered to children between the ages of 8
and 11. A reading score of 1 corresponds to ability to read letters, 2 corresponds to ability to read words, 3 corresponds to ability to
read paragraphs and 4 corresponds to ability to read stories, a math score of 1 corresponds to ability to do recognize numbers, 2 to
ability to do subtraction and 3 to ability to do division, a writing score of 1 refers to the ability to write with 2 or fewer mistakes. In
Columns 4-6, the age at marriage is instrumented by the age at menarche. All regressions include caste fixed effects and district
fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and height, as well as for child age. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** =
significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the
multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Number of 
children
Desired 
number of 
children
Age at first 
birth
Contraceptive 
usage
Number of 
children
Desired 
number of 
children
Age at 
first birth
Contraceptiv
e usage
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage -0.130*** -0.038*** 0.759*** -0.009*** -0.083*** -0.046*** 0.772*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.001) (0.019) (0.014) (0.029) (0.005)
Observations 20,962 30,555 29,166 28,642 20,938 30,523 29,134 28,614
R-squared 0.410 0.289 0.526 0.261 0.405 0.289 0.525 0.259
Mean of dep variable 2.837 2.390 20.03 20.03 2.837 2.390 20.03 20.03
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic . . . 599.8 1.251 842.7 825.2
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage -0.129*** -0.033*** 0.687*** -0.009*** -0.053* -0.020 0.678*** -0.013*
(0.007) (0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.029) (0.014) (0.047) (0.007)
Observations 9,381 12,991 12,725 12,228 9,368 12,966 12,709 12,213
R-squared 0.363 0.292 0.381 0.309 0.354 0.291 0.381 0.309
Mean of dep variable 3.465 2.636 19.44 19.44 3.465 2.636 19.44 19.44
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic . . . 399.9 532.9 535.5 473.8
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation -0.112*** -0.039*** 0.509*** -0.005 -0.117** -0.045 0.476*** 0.011
(0.021) (0.009) (0.033) (0.005) (0.057) (0.027) (0.096) (0.015)
Observations 1,734 2,343 2,326 2,240 1,733 2,285 2,322 2,238
R-squared 0.426 0.393 0.328 0.386 0.426 0.372 0.328 0.382
Mean of dep variable 3.942 2.785 18.96 18.96 3.942 2.785 18.96 18.96
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic . . . 177.5 236.1 221.7 211.3
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables are fertility measures for each of the three samples of women (excluding
also women who married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). The sample in Columns 1 and 5 is restricted to women who state that they
do not desire any more children. ln Columns 5-8, the age at marriage is instrumented by the age at menarche. All regressions include caste fixed effects and district fixed
effects, and control for the mother's height. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the
1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
Table 7: The effect of age at marriage/cohabitation on fertility
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Say in hh 
decisions 
(index)
Can go 
places alone 
(index)
Do not need 
permission 
to go places  
(index)
Discuss with 
husband 
(index)
Say in hh 
decisions 
(index)
Can go 
places alone 
(index)
Do not need 
permission to 
go places  
(index)
Discuss with 
husband 
(index)
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage -0.001 -0.003 0 0.017*** -0.028*** -0.034*** 0.071*** 0.006
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Observations 31,446 31,446 31,446 31,446 31,409 31,409 31,409 31,409
R-squared 0.354 0.225 0.234 0.275 0.348 0.217 0.194 0.274
Mean of dep variable 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 904.8 792.122 904.759 904.8
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage 0.001 -0.010*** -0.007** 0.003 -0.056*** -0.027* 0.067*** 0.024*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014]
Observations 13,426 13,426 13,426 13,426 13,406 13,406 13,406 13,406
R-squared 0.399 0.245 0.252 0.275 0.383 0.244 0.218 0.273
Mean of dep variable -0.0929 -0.2575 -0.1751 -0.644 -0.0929 -0.2575 -0.1751 -0.644
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 566.4 566.4 566.4 566.4
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 -0.001 -0.115*** -0.073** 0.009 0.014
[0.010] [0.011] [0.009] [0.010] [0.030] [0.030] [0.023] [0.031]
Observations 2,424 2,424 2,424 2,424 2,420 2,420 2,420 2,420
R-squared 0.508 0.28 0.386 0.324 0.481 0.269 0.385 0.323
Mean of dep variable -0.9876 -0.5388 -0.2435 -0.3889 -0.9876 -0.5388 -0.2435 -0.3889
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 229.1 229.1 229.1 229.1
Table 8: The effect of age at marriage/cohabitation on bargaining power
OLS IV
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables are measures of status in the household of each of the three samples of women
(excluding women who married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). Each index is constructed by normalizing a series of binary variables to have
mean zero and standard deviation one and then summing the normalized variables, and then renormalizing the final outcome to again have standard deviation one. "(Self-
reported) say in household decisions index" includes whether the respondent has a (self-reported) say in expensive household purchases, what to cook, how many children to
have, what to do when children are ill and whom the children should marry. "Can go to places alone index" includes whether the respondent is allowed to go alone to the local
health center, the local store, relatives/friends. "Do not need permission to go to places index" includes whether the respondent has to ask permission from her in-laws to go to
the local health center, the local store or visit relatives and friends. "Discuss with husband index" includes whether or not the respondent and her husband sometimes talk about
business matters, household expenditure and local politics. In Columns 5-8, the age at marriage/cohabitation is instrumented by the age at menarche. All regressions include
caste fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and height. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant
at the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction procedure of
Benjamini et al (2006).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1(Men Eat 
First)
1(Go out 
with 
husband)
1(Worked 
for cash last 
year)
Hours of 
work
1(Men Eat 
First)
1(Go out 
with 
husband)
1(Worked 
for cash last 
year)
Hours of 
work last 
year
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage -0.004*** 0.015*** -0.004*** -1.101 -0.016*** 0.018*** -0.012*** -5.142
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [1.387] [0.004] [0.005] [0.004] [6.952]
Observations 31,354 31,292 31,446 31,446 31,318 31,256 31,409 31,409
R-squared 0.367 0.254 0.232 0.149 0.362 0.254 0.229 0.149
Mean of dep variable 0.3083 0.5236 0.2337 301.0447 0.3083 0.5236 0.2337 301.0447
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 901.1 896 904.8 904.8
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage -0.002* 0.006*** -0.004** -4.661** -0.015** 0.011 -0.002 -0.745
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [2.298] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [9.840]
Observations 13,396 13,371 13,426 13,426 13,377 13,352 13,406 13,406
R-squared 0.391 0.285 0.312 0.246 0.386 0.284 0.312 0.245
Mean of dep variable 0.3735 0.4145 0.3463 405.1328 0.3735 0.4145 0.3463 405.1328
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 563.1 564.9 566.4 566.4
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation 0.003 -0.008 0.001 4.104 0.004 0.018 0.003 7.924
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [6.833] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [18.106]
Observations 2,418 2,418 2,424 2,424 2,414 2,414 2,420 2,420
R-squared 0.504 0.368 0.372 0.314 0.503 0.356 0.373 0.314
Mean of dep variable 0.4186 0.3521 0.3633 393.8911 0.4186 0.3521 0.3633 393.8911
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 227.7 229.4 229.1 229.1
Table 9: The effect of age at marriage/cohabitation on household bargaining (contd)
OLS IV
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables apply to each of the three samples of women (excluding women who
married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). The variable 1(Worked for cash last year) indicates whether the woman reports any cash
earnings last year, "including DA, housing allowance given in cash, etc.". The variable hours of work is constructed by multiplying the reported number of days worked last
year by the number of hours worked in a usual day. In Columns 5-8, the age at marriage/cohabitation is instrumented by the age at menarche. All regressions include caste
fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and height. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at
the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction procedure of
Benjamini et al (2006).  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any 
antenatal 
care Home birth
Breastfeeding 
duration
Vaccinations 
completed
Years of 
education
Currently 
enrolled
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage -0.011 -0.021** 0.808*** 0.004 0.145*** 0.025***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.261) (0.010) (0.032) (0.005)
Age at marriage * Female child 0.011 0.022 0.122 0.038** -0.078 -0.001
(0.011) (0.013) (0.444) (0.015) (0.047) (0.007)
Observations 15,169 15,201 8,404 15,112 54,269 45,764
R-squared 0.336 0.371 0.184 0.196 0.590 0.149
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 98.66 97.90 34.85 99.15 329.5 319.1
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage -0.010 -0.006 0.373 -0.013 0.116*** 0.022***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.335) (0.012) (0.042) (0.007)
Age at marriage * Female child 0.008 0.003 0.288 0.037* -0.100 -0.009
(0.016) (0.016) (0.468) (0.015) (0.059) (0.010)
Observations 6,568 6,610 3,463 6,609 27,923 23,903
R-squared 0.337 0.297 0.301 0.273 0.469 0.170
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 87.29 85.76 53.15 137.2 239.7 219.2
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation 0.067 -0.019 1.992 -0.05 0.146 0.016
(0.030) (0.029) (1.159) (0.027) (0.084) (0.013)
Age at cohabitation * Female child 0.029 0.022 -1.066 0.059 0.006 0.011
(0.039) (0.034) (2.006) (0.031) (0.132) (0.021)
Observations 1,227 1,234 619 1,228 5,360 4,613
R-squared 0.439 0.377 0.497 0.419 0.509 0.245
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 47.51 43.10 5.346 40.18 100.3 99.82
Table 10: Differential effects of age at marriage/cohabitation on child investments by gender
Health investments
Notes: The table presents the results of IV regressions in which the dependent variables are health and educational investments for the children
of the three samples of women (excluding women who married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). The age at
marriage is instrumented by the age at menarche, and the interaction between age at marriage and gender is instrumented by the interaction
between age at menarche and gender. All regressions include caste fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and
height and child age and gender. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * =
significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction
procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
Educational investments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Size at birth
Weight for 
height (z-
score)
Major 
sickness
One-year 
mortality Reading Writing Math
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage 0.012 0.110** -0.000 -0.002 0.051 0.011 0.048
(0.013) (0.041) (0.001) (0.002) (0.029) (0.010) (0.023)
Age at marriage * Female child 0.033* -0.071 -0.002 0.004 0.008 0.002 -0.013
(0.020) (0.060) (0.002) (0.003) (0.042) (0.015) (0.033)
Observations 15,137 12,200 63,763 88,224 10,081 9,992 10,040
R-squared 0.176 0.115 0.013 0.027 0.255 0.194 0.275
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 98.18 64.77 444.7 769.5 68.28 68.96 68.12
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage 0.052** 0.114** -0.001 -0.001 0.033 0.005 0.026
(0.017) (0.052) (0.002) (0.003) (0.040) (0.014) (0.030)
Age at marriage * Female child 0.011 -0.142 -0.004 0.004 -0.031 -0.022 0.006
(0.023) (0.066) (0.002) (0.004) (0.060) (0.022) (0.044)
Observations 6,592 5,576 31,908 46,218 5,076 5,037 5,067
R-squared 0.232 0.173 0.015 0.031 0.236 0.208 0.266
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 84.82 86.24 314.7 564.8 40.62 40.58 40.76
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation 0.113** 0.342** -0.001 0.005 0.175 0.039 0.116
(0.042) (0.119) (0.003) (0.006) (0.089) (0.028) (0.063)
Age at cohabitation * Female child 0.016 -0.332* -0.008* -0.010 -0.091 0.003 0.008
(0.061) (0.143) (0.004) (0.009) (0.120) (0.044) (0.095)
Observations 1,229 1,087 6,112 9,485 994 980 992
R-squared 0.291 0.283 0.073 0.055 0.375 0.341 0.359
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 42.52 36.74 160.5 385.2 27.15 26.11 27.53
Table 11: Differential effects of age at marriage/cohabitation on child outcomes by gender
Notes: The table presents the results of IV regressions in which the dependent variables are health and educational outcomes for the children of the three
samples of women (excluding women who married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). The age at marriage is instrumented
by the age at menarche, and the interaction between age at marriage and gender is instrumented by the interaction between age at menarche and gender.
All regressions include caste fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and height and child age and gender. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for
the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
Health outcomes Educational outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Knowledge - 
general 
health 
(score out of 
6)
Knowledge - 
AIDS (score 
out of 5)
Knowledge - 
general 
health 
(score out of 
6)
Knowledge 
- AIDS 
(score out 
of 5)
Panel A: Full sample
Age at marriage 0.028*** 0.111*** 0.084** 0.166***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.034) (0.023)
Observations 32,752 32,752 32,715 32,715
R-squared 0.299 0.352 0.277 0.346
Mean of dep variable 2.569 2.269 2.569 2.269
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 1.372 1.372
Panel B: No education
Age at marriage 0.007** 0.027*** 0.053*** 0.062**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.015) (0.024)
Observations 13,943 13,943 13,923 13,923
R-squared 0.268 0.273 0.257 0.271
Mean of dep variable 2.343 1.072 2.343 1.072
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 581.7 581.7
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at cohabitation -0.006 0.020 0.013 0.066
(0.009) (0.013) (0.029) (0.040)
Observations 2,435 2,435 2,430 2,430
R-squared 0.366 0.383 0.365 0.380
Mean of dep variable 2.261 0.834 2.261 0.834
Kleibergen-Paap F-statistic 256.3 256.3
Table 12: The effect of age at marriage/cohabitation on health knowledge
Notes: The table presents the results of OLS and IV regressions in which the dependent variables are
fertility preferences and health knowledge of the three samples of women (excluding also women who
married twice and women who had their first marriage over the age of 40). The two knowledge scores are
calculated by summing the number of correct answers (out of 6 and 5 questions, respectively) to a series
of multiple choice questions. In Columns 4-6, the age at marriage is instrumented by the age at menarche.
All regressions include caste fixed effects and district fixed effects, and control for the mother's age and
height. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5%
level; * = significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes
tested, using the False Discovery Rate correction procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
Figure 1
The figure shows the distribution of the age at marriage, for the three samples.
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Figure 2: Average adult height by age at menarche
The figure plots a smoothed local polynomial to the relationship between adult height and 
the woman's age at menarche. 95% confidence intervals are shown in gray.
15
0
15
1
15
2
15
3
15
4
H
ei
gh
t (c
m
)
10 12 14 16 18 20
Age at menarche
Figure 3
The figure shows the distribution of the age at menarche (for the full sample).
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Mother-in-
law's 
education 
(in yrs)
Father-in-
law's 
education 
(in yrs)
Distance to 
natal village 
(in hrs)
Spouse lives 
in same 
village
Panel A: Full sample
Age at menarche 0.209*** 0.298*** -0.001 -0.002***
(0.011) (0.019) (0.014) (0.001)
0.00000 0.00000 0.96429 0.00246
Observations 9,284 6,647 32,445 32,662
R-squared 0.313 0.287 0.057 0.141
Mean of dep variable 2.390 4.155 3.519 0.139
Panel B: No education
Age at menarche 0.027*** 0.090*** -0.010 -0.003***
(0.009) (0.030) (0.019) (0.001)
0.00156 0.00247 0.58018 0.00351
Observations 3,173 2,121 13,832 13,905
R-squared 0.155 0.228 0.079 0.161
Mean of dep variable 2.636 1.820 3.327 0.123
Panel C: No education, married before menarche
Age at menarche 0.012 -0.111 0.001 -0.005
(0.021) (0.105) (0.058) (0.003)
0.55760 0.28927 0.98439 0.08404
Observations 552 303 2,415 2,431
R-squared 0.212 0.328 0.143 0.194
Mean of dep variable 2.785 1.565 3.379 0.0930
Appendix Table 1: Does age at menarche affect spousal characteristics?
OLS
Notes: The regression results examine whether observable characteristics of the spousal household are affected 
by the woman's age at menarche. The sample sizes shrink significantly in the case of the education of the father 
and mother-in-law, because the parents-in-law could only be identified in the data for a subset of the women. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = significant at the 5% level; * = 
significant at the 1% level. Statistical significance is corrected for the multiplicity of outcomes tested, using the 
False Discovery Rate correction procedure of Benjamini et al (2006).  
